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Abstract 
Monetary circuit theory assumes that the money supply is endogenously determined by 
the banking system. Money is provided by banks through loans and overdraft facilities 
demanded by firms (and households) undertaking real sector activities. Within monetary 
circuit theory money is only considered as a means of payment, not as a store of wealth. 
Unfortunately, Keynes’s important distinction in his Treatise on Money between 
industrial and financial circulation seems to have been lost. Industrial circulation is the 
part of bank credit that goes to firms and households for current business purposes related 
to production and consumption - the focus of monetary circuit theory. Although financial 
circulation is an important part of banks’ balance sheet in the form of savings deposits, 
this is hardly discussed in monetary circuit theory. In this paper, we shall argue that 
monetary circuit theory would be more coherent if it were expanded to incorporate some 
aspects of Keynes’s view on financial circulation. In a modern context, it has become 
apparent that it is financial circulation which contributed significantly to the inflated asset 
bubble in the first place and the credit crunch in the second round. Hence, bank lending, 
which creates means of payment, should be regulated and monitored closely. Banks’ 
industrial activities, notably the creation of means of payment, could be separated from 
speculative activities. Highly liquid stores of wealth, i.e. savings deposits, do not have to 
be means of payment. Hence, banks should be divided into two categories: 
industrial/business banks, where deposits are used as means of payment (and covered by 
a state guarantee), and financial banks, where deposits carry an interest, but are not 
guaranteed by legal arrangement. This regulation would limit the amount of means of 
payment to what is required for production and trade and still make it possible for the 
Central bank to pursue a flexible monetary policy.  
This insight can be obtained by a combination of monetary circuit theory and Keynes’s 
analysis of industrial and financial circulation put forward in his Treatise on Money. 
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Introduction 
 
Monetary circuit theory and post-Keynesian liquidity preference theory of money and 
interest both attach an important role to money and banking in the understanding of 
macroeconomic development. In addition, they share the view that, in a modern 
production economy, money is created (at least partly) endogenously (see Rochon and 
Rossi, 2003). This observation leads directly to the very distinct heterodox economics 
conclusion that money cannot be considered as neutral in any realistic macroeconomic 
analysis. Money and the money creation processes have to be taken deliberately into 
account to understand macroeconomic dynamics. Further, this viewpoint has been 
vindicated in light of the actual economic crisis, which was (at least partly) elicited by 
financial disruptions in general and more specifically by the malfunctioning of the 
banking sector. This observation brings us to initiate our analysis by looking into the 
theory and method of one of the founding fathers of heterodox macroeconomics, John 
Maynard Keynes, who is celebrated by many heterodox macroeconomists, for good 
methodological reasons, as their main source of inspiration. Hence, our intention is to 
follow a string of thought in monetary circuit theory inspired by the writings of Keynes 
on money and macroeconomic crisis. 
 
Although Keynes’s seminal work was entitled The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, it is not the most important source for understanding his 
contributions to the theories of money and banking. The General Theory is primarily an 
exercise in macroeconomic methodology to get a better understanding of the working of 
‘the economy as a whole’. Instead, we should direct our attention to Keynes’s earlier 
theoretical work, with more specific focus on the functioning of the financial sector. That 
is done even though Keynes kept his overall analytical framework within a general 
equilibrium model of the market system. In fact, Keynes (like most other 
macroeconomists at that time) until the early 1930s considered disequilibrium in the real 
economy as caused by financial disruptions – so-called credit cycles (Skidelsky, 1992). 
 
The aim of this paper is to show that the insights of the working of the banking sector that 
Keynes presented in his monetary theory are still very relevant at the time of writing, in 
order to stabilize the activities of banking sector by way of regulation. To date, banks are 
entitled to accept deposits as part of what Keynes, 1930 called industrial and financial 
circulation, which are used as means of payment. These activities have made the banking 
sector expand its activities beyond the narrow requirements of means of payments used 
for real production activity. In this paper we argue that industrial (real production) 
circulation and financial (speculative) circulation should be clearly separated, because the 
systemic risk inherent in the banking sector is uncontrolled without an external 
monitoring authority and causes uncertainty with regard to the stability of the money 
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(means of payments) system. There is a case for a more clear legislation of requirements 
related to monitoring of risk profile and solvency of banks with can create means of 
payments by accepting deposits.  From a theoretical point of view the legal requested 
monitoring should concentrate on banks providing credit (and deposits) used for 
industrial circulation, which on the other hand could be secured by a state guarantee, 
giving these deposits an indisputable and perfect liquidity as a means of payments. 
Keynes as an early monetary theorist 
Keynes was by specialization a monetary theorist. For many years his course of lectures 
at Cambridge University had the heading of ‘a pure theory of money’. His main ideas on 
money and banking were presented in two books: A Tract on Monetary Reform (Keynes, 
1923) and A Treatise on Money (Keynes, 1930, two volumes). In these books we find 
Keynes’s discussion of the institutional framework of the banking system and the 
financial sector as a potential cause of disruption in an otherwise smooth functioning real 
market economy. This view financial instability was by itself a novelty within 
neoclassical economics in the 1920s (Toporowski, 2005). Until the outbreak of the deep 
economic crisis of the early 1930s, mainstream theories considered money and finance 
mainly as a ‘veil’, which in the short run might hide the development of the real economy 
rather than having any significant impact. Basically, if money and credit were controlled, 
they would have a role for the proper functioning of the real sector economy like oil for 
an engine – simply to make it run more smoothly. In that perspective, the banking sector 
only had a facilitating role as provider of means of payment. These means of payment, 
however, were without any significance, because production was assumed to be 
determined by the supply of factors of production. Hence, the real sector performance 
was analysed as though it was similar to a barter economy, where workers were paid in 
terms of goods, and profit was given by the production in excess of the sum of wage 
goods. This mainstream economic analysis concluded that if the barter economy could be 
organized by way of a general and instantaneous market-clearing mechanism, like the 
Walrasian auctioneer, then money and credit were unimportant except for the 
determination of the price level (a Marshallian perspective recognized, among other, by 
Leijonhufvud, 1968). In other words money was considered as being neutral. 
 
Keynes’s aspiration during the 1920s was to understand the working of the financial 
sector and especially of banks’ role in the rather prolonged process of real sector 
disequilibrium. Keynes argued that disruptions within the flows of credit caused among 
other things by banks’ activities could have a longer lasting impact on the real economy 
than hitherto understood. The time dragging process was caused by real sector 
(mal)adjustments as a consequence of ‘wrong’ relative prices. The credit cycle could 
make prices (and wages) deviate for a considerable time period from their general 
equilibrium values. In the 1920s Keynes argued that these monetary mechanisms were 
(parts of) the main explanation for unemployment being a semi-persistent phenomenon – 
hence, that money and credit were not just a veil. 
 
Further, in A Tract on Monetary Reform, Keynes (1923) showed empirically that changes 
in money supply/bank deposits could not fully explain the development in the (consumer) 
price level. This observation led him to investigate the functioning of the banking sector 
much more thoroughly during the 1920s. By the end of that decade, he succeeded at last 
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in finishing his writing of what he considered himself as his opus magnus, A Treatise on 
Money (TM) in two volumes: the pure theory of money and the applied theory of money. 
His ambition was to explain the monetary and financial causalities of the (obviously) 
slow adjustment processes towards general equilibrium. The supply of money did deviate 
from its ‘optimal’ level owing to the behaviour of banks. Further – and this was a kind of 
theoretical novelty – the actual and market-determined rate of interest might deviate for a 
prolonged period from the natural rate of interest (to use the Wicksellian term). 
 
However, throughout the 1920s Keynes still worked within the neoclassical analytical 
frame of a long-run general equilibrium model.2 This rather constraining methodological 
assumption should not prevent us from getting useful insights from his writings on how 
the banking sector supplies money and how the market rate of interest is determined. 
These insights are in all cases helpful in order to obtain a better understanding of the 
current financial and economic crisis. 
 
 
Banks supplying money: industrial and financial circulation 
Keynes provided the reader of TM with important knowledge about the working of the 
banking system as a whole. The development of private banks cannot be understood 
without taking into account the private sector behaviour with regard to the supply of bank 
deposits and demand for bank loans and credit. Banks adjust their behaviour partly as a 
mirror picture of their customers’ financial requests.3 
 
Initially, Keynes divided the endogenous part of the money supply, that is, bank deposits, 
into two categories: industrial circulation and financial circulation. 
 
By industry we mean the business of maintaining the normal process of current 
output, distribution and exchange and paying the factors of production their 
incomes for the various duties which they perform from the first beginning of 
production to the final satisfaction of the consumer. By finance, on the other hand, 
we mean the business of holding and exchanging existing titles to wealth, 
including stock exchange and money market transactions, speculation and the 
process of conveying current savings and profits into the hands of entrepreneurs.  
Each of these two branches of business uses a certain part of the total 
stock of money [see Table 1]. Broadly speaking, industry requires the use of 
income deposits and of a part of the business deposits, which we will call business 
deposits A, while finance requires the use of savings deposits and of the 
remainder of business deposits, B. Thus the sum of the two former bank deposits 
is the industrial circulation and the sum of the two latter deposits is the financial 
circulation (TM, pp. 217-18). 
 
                                                 
2
 On the other hand, his phrase on the lack of importance of long-run analysis is well known (see Keynes, 
1923, p. 65). 
3
 There is a striking parallel between Keynes’s theory of effective demand for output and his theory of 
’effective demand for money’ (see Jespersen, 2009b, Ch. 8). 
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Table 1. A single bank’s balance sheet using Keynes’s definitions 
 
Assets                              Liabilities 
 
1. Cash                           L1. Income deposits (households)i 
2. Loans A                      L2. Business deposits Ai 
        ------------------------------------------------- 
3. Loans B                      L3. Business deposits B(f) 
4. Treasury bonds           L4. Savings deposits(f) 
5. Shares                          5. Interbank deposits 
                                         6. Bank’s equity capital 
 
Notes: Industrial circulation = income deposits (households)i + business deposits Ai 
Financial circulation = business deposits B(f) + savings (households and businesses) 
deposits(f)  
Loan A: businesses and households lending for current real sector transactions and 
activities 
Loan B: lending by other financial institutions and so-called investment banks 
 
 
In the terminology of Keynes, money supply was separated into industrial circulation, 
containing L1 and L2, and financial circulation, containing L3 and L4, but he rather 
quickly dismissed L3 as unimportant. 
 
Keynes had a number of arguments to explain the direction of causality behind the 
different items on the bank’s balance sheet. First, he emphasized that the industrial 
circulation is caused by firms’ (and households’) demand for transaction money/means 
of payments. This demand is determined by the needed means of payment derived from 
the undertaking of real sector transactions. This corresponds to ‘actively created deposits’ 
(TM, p. 22) and is directly related to the flow of real output valued at market prices. 
Therefore, Keynes called this revolving part of the bank’s liabilities the ‘current account’ 
closely related to these factor income-generating activities. The relevant bank deposits 
are ‘actively created’ when businesses are demanding working capital from banks for the 
undertaking of real-sector activities, that is, production. Banks supply these means of 
payment through both direct loans and overdraft facilities. 
 
Private banks play a unique institutional role in a monetary production economy, because 
their liabilities can be used as means of payment – bank loans, overdraft facilities, and 
deposits are the oil of the real economy, sine qua non. Deposits of any kind in a financial 
institution, chartered as a bank, are considered in modern textbooks as perfect substitutes 
to central-bank notes (and coins). There is in textbooks seldom attached any kind of 
uncertainty to the functioning of the entire banking system. The latter is just considered 
in aggregate form, as a safe provider of means of payment. Apparently, Keynes would 
have disagreed. 
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The important interrelationship between financial institutions and uncertainty could also 
be learned from Keynes’s (1926) The End of Laissez Faire (reprinted in CWK, vol. IX). 
In the financial sector, if anywhere, the functioning of institutions builds on trust and a 
stream of positive historical experiences. To date, central bank liabilities have been 
considered without hesitation as high-powered money – no one would ask for gold as the 
ultimate means of payment. But the recent financial crisis has shown that deposits of 
private banks do not in general have the same status as ultimate means of payment for a 
number of reasons, namely: 
 
• private banks can go bankrupt; 
• private banks are so intertwined that if one big (or medium-sized) bank fails, the 
entire banking system might become illiquid; 
• the central bank may cease to act as lender of last resort. 
 
To overcome this inherently institutional uncertainty within the banking sector, some 
arrangement of deposit insurance organized by the government as the most nationally 
reliable institution has become necessary in many (Western) countries. Without such a 
guarantee, a number of existing banks would have been excluded from the interbank 
market, which immediately would have caused a run on these banks – as noticed in 
relation to the British bank Northern Rock in spring 2008 and took full scale in 
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers investment bank collapsed.  
 
One question emerged from these dramatic episodes, should deposits of any bank 
independent of its financial enterprises be cover by an unlimited state deposit guarantee?  
It is reasonable to cover whatever bank activity just because the deposits are used as 
means of payments? Why not, in the future, make a clear cut separation between banks 
solely undertaking activities related to financing real production, consumption and real 
investment activities (as measured in the national accounting system) and other banking 
activities mainly related to financial/speculative purposes. One thing is to finance current 
production quite another thing is to establish final finance of real wealth. Originally, 
banking was divided into on the one hand business bank servicing firms with (revolving) 
working capital and means of payments and on the other hand investment bank providing 
ultimate finance (derived for savings).4  
In the next section we will discuss possible regulations in light of the different definitions 
of circulation/deposits provided by Keynes, 1930. Our suggestion is that only financial 
institutions carrying out transactions related to industrial circulation, so-called current 
transaction related to real-sector activities, should be allowed to act as providers of state 
guaranteed means of payments and, hence, be allowed to call themselves banks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 In Denmark it has until very recently been the legal practice, that the building sector was financed by 
banks, but households buying a living home (or business and farmers buying real estates) had to get the 
needed loans from a mortgage institute (investment bank) which obtain fund by issuing and selling bond in 
advance – and these institutional mortgage bonds are not state guaranteed.  
 7
Why industrial and financial circulation ought to be separated 
Trust is the keyword for the activities within the banking sector. Changes in industrial 
circulation, of course, do not always match changes in loans granted to businesses (and 
households) by each individual bank. When a loan is granted by bank A, the related 
deposits might flow into another bank B, depending on business activity and customs. In 
that case, bank A has a deficit of deposits and bank B is in the opposite situation, with 
excess deposits. If bank B trusts bank A, they meet on the interbank market (called a 
clearing house in the interwar period) at the end of the day, where bank A will get the 
needed deposits to balance its book in the form of a (short-term) loan from banks with 
excess deposits, in casu bank B. 
 
However, this process of deposit intermediation from surplus banks to deficit banks via 
the interbank market cannot be considered as an automatic process. It depends on trust. 
Although loans and deposits in the end add up to the same amount according to double-
entry bookkeeping rules, a deficit bank has to be trusted to get the needed funds on the 
interbank market at the end of the day. The orderly working of the banking system relies 
so much on trust, legislation, and good reputation as regards the specific mechanics of 
interbank payments (see for instance Rossi, 2007, pp. 67-78). 
 
Industrial circulation is the part of the banks’ balance sheet that relates to current real 
activities in the form of households’ and firms’ transaction deposits. For the single bank 
these deposits are passively accepted during the day depending on the customers’ habits 
of payments. For the banking system as a whole the industrial circulation (the sum of the 
income deposits and business deposits, see Table 1) is determined by the amount of bank 
loans granted for ordinary real-sector activities required for production and/or used for 
buying durable consumer goods and real investment goods. Owing to their customized 
relationships with business and households, private banks have an absolute advantage in 
assessing the creditworthiness of their customers and their planned activities. This 
knowledge is the best available information to approve on loans and to assess the related 
credit risk by individual banks. In fact, banks earn their profits from the margin of 
interest (minus credit risk) between the loans to businesses and households and the 
interest paid on deposits.5 
 
The practical problem of the banker consists, therefore, in so managing his affairs 
that his daily accruing assets in the shape of cash and claims shall be as nearly as 
possible equal to his daily accruing liabilities in these forms. It follows that the 
rate at which the bank can, with safety, actively create deposits by lending and 
investing has to be in a proper relation to the rate at which it is passively creating 
them against the receipt of liquid resources from its depositors (TM, pp. 21-22). 
 
In this passage from TM, Keynes warns the individual banker that he should aim at 
balancing the banks’ book of real-sector related activities. Loans to businesses and 
households should be balanced by an approximately equivalent inflow of industrial 
deposits. Of course, there might be deviations in this balance; but the wise banker should 
                                                 
5
 In fact, the interest on bank deposits could be (and has been for longer period in the US) regulated by law. 
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try to avoid an aggressive loan behaviour, which leaves the bank in a permanent deficit of 
deposits and makes the bank persistently dependent on short-term loans on the interbank 
market. 
 
The above passage from TM could be read as a warning against the individual bank 
underestimating systemic risk related to the financial sector in general and more 
specifically to the banking system interlinked through the interbank market. 
 
Within post-Keynesian literature, it is especially Hyman Minsky (1975) who has 
discussed the consequences of individual bankers underrating the systemic risk related to 
bank loans. According to the taxonomy set out by Minsky with regard to modern banking 
(see, for instance, Nesvetailova, 2007), bankers’ forms of behaviour have not been as 
prudent as knowledge of systemic risk would imply. Minsky’s hypothesis is that bankers 
(and other financial institutions) seem to revise their lending behaviour according to the 
experiences of the recent past rather quickly. Minsky singles out three stages of lending 
behaviour with increasingly reduced margin of safety: hedge loans, speculative loans, and 
Ponzi loans. The behaviour towards risk changes during the business cycle. In its early 
upswing, banks are rather restrictive in their lending activities and ask borrowers to pay 
interest and instalments on their loans currently to ‘hedge’ against credit risk. But, if the 
economy goes on booming with continuously rising profits, banks become less risk 
averse. They do not really find it necessary to ask firms (and households) to pay loans 
back, because default risk seems for the individual bank to have been reduced. Then 
banks become more willing to make loans automatically revolve, but interests are 
assumed still to be paid on these revolving, so-called speculative, loans. In the final phase 
of the business cycle upswing, Minsky’s instability hypothesis considers banks as 
becoming super-optimistic and ceasing to require interest to be paid. Instead, loans are 
enlarged and collateralized by an expectation of further increases in business earnings 
and asset prices in the future. Minsky calls this type of loans, which are serviced through 
new loans, as Ponzi financing. In that case, business and investment banks (and their 
customers) have made themselves dependent on an expectation of continuously growing 
business cycle and asset prices – which is an illusion at the macroeconomic level. Indeed, 
the stock market cannot go on increasing the price-to-earnings ratio, and house prices 
cannot forever go on rising more quickly than the costs of making new houses and real 
income of new house owners. Something will give in.  
 
When bankers involve themselves into Ponzi financing schemes at the same time, they 
easily overlook systemic risk. The banking sector as a whole becomes increasingly 
fragile when aggregated bank loans expand more speedily than the real economy. In such 
cases an external monitoring body is needed to restrict the total credit formation. Each 
individual banker may think that he is smarter than the average; but ‘the average banker’ 
cannot be smarter than the average. Hence, in the final phase of the Ponzi credit cycle the 
banking sector becomes increasingly instable without individual bankers really noticing 
it. To prevent such Ponzi financing schemes to build up, an external regulation authority 
overlooking systemic risk is needed. (Systemic risk within the banking sector is discussed 
further below.) 
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Financial circulation is mainly speculative activities 
Financial circulation can be separated in Table 1. According to Keynes’s argument, it 
consists of ‘business deposits B’ and ‘savings deposits’. By business deposits B ‘we 
mean the business of holding and exchanging existing titles to wealth, including stock 
exchange and money market transaction, speculation and the process of conveying 
current savings and profits into the hands of entrepreneurs’ (TM, p. 217). 
 
With regard to saving deposits ‘as a means of employing savings, i.e. as an investment’ 
(TM, p. 31), one should be extremely careful with the interpretation. Here, Keynes seems 
not to distinguish clearly between financial and real investment. That had to wait until 
GT. The important point is that saving deposits might be used for final finance of real 
investment, i.e. being a part of the financial circulation. In the TM Keynes did not 
separate between savings deposits based on an inflow of loanable funds, and a change in 
portfolio selection caused by increased speculative demand for money. In GT Keynes 
gave up focusing on the distinction between the speculative flow and stock demand for 
financial circulation. Instead he emphasized that the speculative demand for money can 
be fulfilled by any financial asset which possesses a stable money value and is easy to 
sell at short notice.6 This means that it is the ability of having a high degree of liquidity 
(i.e. tradability) of saving deposits rather than being a direct means of payment, which 
plays the most important role in Keynes’s speculative demand for money. This is the so-
called liquidity preference theory of money, which Keynes did not fully unfold in TM. On 
the other hand Keynes hardly mentioned the role of banks in the GT, so one has to 
combine these two books to get the full understanding of how banks, according to 
Keynes, act and how they could be regulated within a monetary production economy in 
an attempt to reduce monetary instability. 
 
In Table 1 we expanded Keynes’s taxonomy by adding ‘Loan B’ and interbank deposits. 
The activities of banks and non-banks are not clearly separated. They have due to to 
deregulation and changed legislation become something like financial ‘supermarkets’: 
with a number of asset activities indoor - business banking (industrial circulation), 
investment banking (financial circulation), mortgage banking (financing long-term real 
investments) together with credit card management. Further, these financial supermarkets 
are interrelated through cross-ownership and mutual guarantees issued in an attempt to 
diversify credit risks. On the other hand, a number of banks have specialized in specific 
lending and asset management activities, and, on the other hand, financial institutions.  
 
There is no longer a specific and clearly regulated structure of financial institutions that 
are allowed to accept deposits considered as means of payment, which are considered and 
used as to exercise purchasing power. The risk-profile of these (transnational) financial 
supermarkets is extremely difficult to unveil owing to: 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In a footnote Keynes wrote, that ‘[f]or example, we can treat as money any command over general 
purchasing power which the owner has not parted with for a period in excess of three month […]. It is often 
convenient in practice to include in money time-deposits with banks and, occasionally, even such 
instruments as (e.g.) treasury bills’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 167). 
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• lack of balance-sheet transparency; 
• lack of understanding of how the financial sector as a whole works, which makes it 
difficult to understand systemic risk, which cannot be reduced through diversification. 
 
From the above discussion of industrial circulation and financial circulation, it should 
have become obvious that they serve two rather different purposes. The first kind of 
circulation provides the necessary means of payment for the monetary circuit behind the 
monetary production economy. 
 
Business/Industrial banks could be defined according to the specific role of being the 
only financial institutions accepting deposits which are legally allowed to be used as 
means of payment. This definition requires a clear-cut distinction between deposits used 
as means of payment, and other financial liabilities. Business banks should concentrate 
on facilitating current real activities with a kind of credit that automatically is 
transformed into means of payment which can undisputedly be used as industrial 
circulation. This undisputed liquidity can be established by state guarantee. But to obtain 
such a guarantee business banks should be willing to accept a rather strict regulation and 
surveillance which makes their balance sheets transparent and secure a diversified loan 
portfolio. This kind of regulation would probably require a rather detailed manual on 
allowed banking activities and further a regulated incentive structure of managing 
directors.  
The unlimited state guarantee does only apply to chartered business banks. In that case 
the regulation of all other financial institutions (incl. investment banks) becomes less 
important from a monetary stability point of view, as long as their deposits will not 
circulate as means of payment. 
 
This interpretation of Keynes’s division between industrial circulation and financial 
circulation leads to an important distinction between money as a means of payment 
needed for production and final demand, and liquid financial assets used as a secure store 
of wealth, but not necessarily a means of payments (e.g. Treasury Bills). 
 
Financial circulation consists mainly of saving deposits that are demanded by wealth 
owners in their behaviour towards optimizing their financial portfolio with regard to their 
expectations on future rates of interest, inflation, and personal expenses. Saving deposits 
should be liquid in the sense, described by Keynes in GT, that they have a fixed nominal 
price and are easy to sell; but they do not have to be means of payment. This is a very 
important conclusion, because in these cases it does not have to be business banks that 
accept saving deposits – which, owing to speculation, are the most unstable part of banks’ 
liabilities. 
 
 
The fragilities of the traditional banking system 
If banks always behaved prudently, and if they interact smoothly through the interbank 
market, there is, following Keynes, ‘no limit to the amount of bank money which the 
banks can safely create provided that they move forward in step’ (TM, p. 23). This 
seemingly self-regulating system is seductive, because ‘[a] monetary system of this kind 
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would possess an inherent instability; for any event which tended to influence the 
behaviour of the majority of banks in the same direction […] would be capable of setting 
up a violent movement of the whole system’ (TM, p. 23). 
 
Keynes was hinting at the systemic risk that is inherent in the functioning of the banking 
system. There is a persistent risk of even sound banks becoming illiquid, when just one 
middle-sized bank fails. The smooth movements of bank transactions require that 
‘deposit-deficit banks’ can get the needed liquidity at the end of the day at a reasonable 
price, which is disrupted when just one bank fails. Keynes, on the other hand, did not 
really discuss the other systemic risk (one should probably better say uncertainty) related 
to banks becoming insolvent, that is, when their equity capital evaporates. This type of 
uncertainty has always been related to the risk of loans to businesses (and households) 
not being reimbursed, but the risk of insolvency has changed dramatically in tandem with 
the increasing financial circulation. 
 
Although banks aim at reducing their credit risk by portfolio diversification, they cannot 
avoid in a nationally and internationally integrated financial sector being exposed to a 
number of similar events. One reason for this mutual exposure is a global price volatility 
of financial assets, which became apparent in the fall of 2008 (and at many previous 
occasions, namely, in 1982, 1987, 1993, 1997, and 2000-1). Owing to growing 
globalization, these volatile asset prices are a worldwide phenomenon, which implies that 
even internationally diversified portfolios are exposed to a common risk of asset price 
fluctuations. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we will discuss these risks in light of the current financial 
crisis, and considering the insights from Keynes’s major works as discussed so far. 
 
The risk of illiquidity 
Keynes had in mind the risk of illiquidity, because every single bank has to clear its cash-
position at the end of each day. If during the day the individual bank has had a deposit-
deficit that exceeds its initial stock of cash (that is, outside money), this bank is illiquid 
(short of cash). The cash balance can be restored by the end of the day through borrowing 
in the interbank market or by using the discount window of the central bank.7 If one 
(major) bank is excluded from the interbank market, the entire banking system run the 
risk of becoming illiquid and a liquidity crisis may develop. This could easily occur when 
bank deposits are not guaranteed. Then a run on the bank might be initiated just on the 
rumour that it is short of cash. This run is difficult to withstand, because the cash/deposit 
ratio will always be too small in such a case. This is not a matter of the bank being 
solvent: lack of cash (primarily liquidity) may force the bank to close down its shutters, 
until a source of liquidity has been established, which could easily be found too late. The 
liquidity squeeze will spread quickly. Just one closed bank means that its (ordinary) 
customers (other banks, firms, and households) cannot use their deposits as means of 
payment. Subsequently, the bank’s customers will become illiquid – and the liquidity 
crisis will spread like a forest fire to other banks and firms. 
                                                 
7
 Not to complicate the analysis, let us just assume that the central bank has one rate of interest that 
effectively sets the opportunity price of liquid funds. 
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Central bank lender of last resort interventions can prevent the financial sector from 
experiencing a liquidity short fall. Usually, the central bank does step in and supports all 
solvent banks with the needed liquidity. Instead of forcing banks to sell off there most 
liquid financial assets and to call back loans from businesses (and households), these 
assets can be accepted as collateral for liquidity loans from the central bank at a 
reasonable rate of interest. If the central bank renounces from acting as lender of last 
resort, illiquid banks have to sell their financial assets. This will cause asset prices to fall 
and will increase the risk of default. The size of equity capital will crumble when these 
asset prices fall. This risk applies not only to those banks that sell their assets, but to all 
holders of financial assets, especially if they have a high balance/own capital ratio.8 The 
higher this ratio (gearing), the more easily is the equity capital washed away, and the 
bank becomes insolvent. 
 
In September 2008, when one of the largest US investment banks, Lehman Brothers, was 
excluded from the interbank market, it had to close down its shutters immediately. The 
implication of this unexpected bank failure was a general distrust within the American 
banking sector. The question was immediately asked ‘who is next?’ It came as a big 
surprise to the financial sector that no rescue plan for Lehman Brothers was set up neither 
from Washington nor from the Federal Reserve system. The repercussions of the 
interbank market interruption were much wider and dramatic than expected, because the 
financial circulation had become dominant in the banks’ balance sheets. Therefore, the 
financial gearing had increased and by that the interdependency within the banking 
system. 
 
The implication of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse was that the interbank market stopped 
functioning immediately. Banks with an excess of cash would not risk their liquidity to 
be frozen (or perhaps lost) in another collapsing bank. Hence, they preferred to put their 
excess liquidity directly into the central bank, although the relevant rate of interest was 
less favourable. Deficit-banks became thereby severely liquidity squeezed. The federal 
government had to act swiftly to de-freeze the interbank market, by providing a kind of 
unlimited state guarantee to all (normal) depositors within the banking system (business 
and investment banks). When that had been done, surplus-banks were once again willing 
to lend to other banks, which made the interbank market start to re-function, but at a 
smaller and more hesitant scale. 
 
The uncertainty of insolvency  
Illiquidity and insolvency are technically speaking two different phenomena. As 
explained above, banks have to balance their books every day – loans have to be matched 
by deposits and interbank loans. Insolvency is another risk caused by lack of own/equity 
capital. These two risks are however interconnected. An insolvent bank is forced by law 
to close down. In fact, the legal requirement for a bank to operate is at a minimum size of 
equity capital amounting to 8 per cent of the total (risk-weighted asset balance). This 
                                                 
8
 For banks the balance/own capital ratio should not fall below 8 per cent according to Basel agreements. In 
such case they are considered in a vulnerable position and will usually be asked to increase their own 
capital. 
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implies that if a bank comes close to this minimum, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
it to obtain interbank market loans and a run on this bank is looming. To the best of our 
knowledge, Lehman Brothers was insolvent at the time of collapse, which explains why 
no other financial institution was willing to take it over – too many bad loans and volatile 
financial assets had eroded its equity capital. 
 
On the other hand, an illiquid bank that is forced to sell quickly assets (and to call loans 
back) could easily experience that the equity capital is eroded owing to falling assets 
prices. Hence, insolvency often follows in the wake of illiquidity, if the lender of last 
resort does not act quickly, because then an increasing number of banks have to sell their 
financial assets at the same time. 
 
Defaults on loans are, of course, to a minor degree unavoidable in an uncertain economic 
environment as the one ‘we happen to live in’. But once again it makes sense to separate 
between bank loans to businesses and households (the ‘active’ part of industrial 
circulation), and bank loans to other financial institutions (the ‘speculative’ part of 
financial circulation). As the gearing of the asset-balance traditionally is much higher in a 
financial institution than in firms and households, the risk of default is higher and 
enforced by the high degree of interdependency within the financial sector. 
 
Conclusion and policy recommendations 
From the above analysis inspired by Keynes’s distinction between industrial circulation 
and financial circulation, there are a number of straightforward policy recommendations 
to make the means of payments system more stable. 
  
Following the above arguments, there are two important but distinct characteristics of 
industrial and financial circulation which could, as mentioned above, be delegated to two 
distinctively regulated financial institutions: business banks, on the one hand, and 
financial banks/institutions (what we used to call investment bank, i.e. financial 
institution in a broad sense), on the other hand. Business banks should undertake the 
provision of means of payment for real-sector activities, which is prominent in monetary 
circuit theory. Business banks supply the industrial circulation/deposits which function as 
means of payment. To avoid liquidity crises, it is important that these business banks 
deposits are state guaranteed, and therefore closely regulated by legislation and 
monitored by a government body of supervision. 
 
Financial banks/institutions could undertake other financial activities, which can be 
detached from being providers of means of payment, for instance matching funds for 
longer term savings and real investment or shifts in financial portfolio selection. One 
crucial role of these financial institutions is to facilitate the long term final financing of 
real investment in a liquid form without being means of payments. Therefore an 
important part of financial circulation is considered (and called) saving deposits, provided 
by financial banks/institutions. Of course, financial banks and other financial institutions 
should also be regulated by law and publicly supervised; but in a less severe form than 
the business banks, because people will know that the higher rate of interest paid on 
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savings deposit in financial banks/institutions are paid because no state guarantee is 
(according to my proposal) is backing saving deposits. 
 
A clear-cut separation between business banks and financial banks/institutions would 
secure that the means-of-payment function is anchored in such a way that the systemic 
risk within the banking sector can be better controlled by the authorities. The systemic 
problem causing the means of payments crisis in 2008 was that the overall sum of bank 
loans had expanded much too fast. The growth of bank credit exceeded the need for 
means of payment undertaking real sector activities. Transactions between banks, 
investment banks, mortgage institutions, insurance companies, and so on, have grown 
immensely and drawn a stream of newly-invented financial products supplied by banks. 
This development occurred partly because of deregulation (among other things implying 
increased globalization) and partly owing to changed financial technologies (and 
products), which have called for portfolio diversification to an extent that dominates the 
balance sheets of financial institutions and even ordinary banks. The extension of 
financial circulation by (ordinary) banks has imposed a considerable extra risk to the 
entire banking system as a whole, which was hardly recognized by individual banks. 
Deregulation nationally and globally has made it more difficult to overlook and 
understand the individual banks, which is a further argument for the division of the status 
of deposits in business banks and in other financial institutions. 
 
A related question is to decide on the exact requirements to be fulfilled before a financial 
institution should be allowed to call itself a business bank. The most important thing is to 
secure that equity capital is protected against unforeseeable risks. As stressed in monetary 
circuit theory, banks provide the means of payment. Therefore, they have a unique role to 
play, which can be undermined by lack of trust. One good indicator of trustworthiness is 
the size of a bank’s equity capital. The actual development has shown that most banks 
had too little equity capital, when they are allowed to be a financial supermarket. In the 
paper I have argued that industrial circulation should be anchored in ‘industrial’ i.e. 
business banks, which have received a special charter that makes their deposits legal 
tender by law and is backed by state guarantee. In addition one should put a number of 
restrictions on the kind and size of loans these banks are allowed to grant to business and 
households. These restrictions would reduce the risk of bankruptcy and therefore liquidity 
crises within a reformed (and down sized) banking sector.  
 
Furthermore, the reduced scale of activities would also limit the size of the balance sheet 
of the individual business banks’ balance sheets. Smaller banks have less market power 
and less political impact. In fact, it were (and still is) a democratic problem that banks – 
providers of means of payment – had grown so big, that they were ‘too big to fail’. The 
experience of Lehman Bothers’ bankruptcy was scaring for US authorities. But the 
situation had become even worse in Iceland, where banks had grown to such a size, that 
they had become too big to be saved by the government (without support from the 
International Monetary Fund). Chartered banks should in that perspective concentrate on 
supplying industrial circulation, be prudently regulated, and be required to increase its 
own capital more than proportionally when it grows larger.  
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Financial circulation is not directly related to real activities and could therefore be treated 
as any other ordinary financial activity without special considerations. The liabilities of 
financial banks/institutions, however, should not be given the status of ultimate means of 
payment. On the other hand, the regulation of financial institutions will have a derived 
impact on real sector activities through a number of channels. They are providers of final 
long term financial capital, which is required when real investments have been produced 
and are ready to be sold. Furthermore the activities of investment bank, pension funds 
and mortgage funds do have an impact on the longer term rate of interest and on share 
prices, which determine the financial cost of long term borrowing.   
 
In sum, industrial and financial circulation should be institutionally and legally separated. 
This is one lesson learned from Keynes, which has only partly been integrated into 
monetary circuit theory and more dramatically so into the regulatory and supervisory 
regime at the time of writing. 
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